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BREXIT: A TALE OF EXIT OVER VOICE 
Brigid Laffan
‘Membership of the EU is the means by which nation states preserve and 
protect their interests and values, whereas standing alone puts those inter-
ests and values at risk’1
On the 23rd of June 2016, the UK electorate voted narrowly to leave the 
EU having joined in 1973, over 43 year earlier. The Lisbon Treaty (2009) 
made provision for the exit of a Member State under the procedures out-
lined in Article 50 (EU, TEU). The UK decision was a shock to the EU 
and a harbinger of political turmoil in the UK. The British Prime Minister 
David Cameron resigned immediately and was replaced by Teresa May 
who appointed a very different cabinet which included many of those 
who had campaigned for Brexit. The referendum outcome destabilised 
the UK because there was majority support for Remain in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. The new UK Government took until March 29, 2017 
to deliver its Article 50 notification letter which began the formal process 
of withdrawal. This was followed by the decision of PM May to call a 
UK general election on June 8, 2017. The general election did not lead 
to the expected outcome of an enhanced majority for the Government. 
Rather, PM May found herself facing a hung parliament when she lost the 
majority won by PM Cameron in May 2015. This forced her to negotiate 
support from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland 
which has formally agreed to vote with the Government on major issues 
including the laws related to Brexit (UK Gov, 2017). 
The lengthy timespan between the referendum and notification 
enabled the EU to overcome its shock and begin to prepare for the world 
of EU27. The heads of government met informally in September 2016 
1  Armstrong K.A., 2017, Brexit Time, CUP, 282. 
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in Bratislava to establish a road map for the future development of the 
Union minus the UK (EU, 2016). This was followed by the issuing of 
negotiating guidelines and directives in April and May 2017 (EU 2017). 
This paper analyses the key elements of the negotiating process, the issues 
to be addressed including the attitudes of the two parties and the posi-
tion of financial services in these negotiations. By definition, the subject 
matter of the paper is a moving target given the uncertainty of UK poli-
tics and the dynamic nature of the Brexit negotiations. 
Managing an Exit 
The European Union (EU) is a negotiating machine which has built up an 
impressive capacity to get agreement among its Member States on a large 
body of law and public policy instruments. It is also a formidable nego-
tiator in the international arena with over 881 bilateral treaties and 259 
multilateral treaties to its name. Following the UK referendum, the EU 
is embarking on an unprecedented negotiation to agree the departure of 
one of its largest members. This endows these negotiations with a signif-
icance that is symbolic, existential, material and consequential. To put it 
simply, these negotiations are not about creating a better future but about 
damage limitation and the attribution of loss from the perspective of the 
EU. International trade and economic negotiations are usually designed 
to being parties together and to arrive at an outcome that is superior to 
the status quo as possible. The Brexit negotiations, on the other hand, 
are about disentanglement, new barriers and further differentiation. The 
UK’s partners in the Union neither sought nor favoured Brexit. However, 
having overcome the initial turbulence associated with the vote, the EU 
went into problem solving mode and quickly set up Brexit Task Forces 
in the Commission and the Council. Michel Barnier, a former Commis-
sioner, was appointed by the EU as its chief negotiator from October 
1, 2016. The European Parliament, although not a formal negotiating 
partner, is a key player and has appointed the longstanding senior politi-
cian Guy Verhofstadt to act as its Brexit coordinator and spokesperson. 
There has been remarkable consensus on the EU side that there would be 
no informal meetings or discussions with the UK authorities prior to the 
Article 50 notification. The time between July 2016 and end March 2017 
was spent by European institutions preparing for the negotiations and 
the preparations were characterised by meticulous assessment across the 
entire gambit of EU policies of the consequences of Brexit and the issues 
associated with disentangling the UK from the Union. 
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Article 50 established the legal format for negotiations. Once a 
Member State issues an Article 50 notification, the EU responds with 
a set of negotiating guidelines agreed by the European Council acting 
without the country that intends to exit. This is then followed by an 
agreement to a set of negotiating directives prepared by the Commission 
and agreed in the Council. Article 50 made provision for the involve-
ment of the European Parliament as it must consent to the Withdrawal 
Agreement. In addition, COREPER and a specially established Art. 50 
Working Group follow the negotiations on a continuous basis. The Euro-
pean Council remains seized of the negotiations from start to finish and 
reviews, up-dates and develops the negotiating guidelines as the process 
evolves. In this way, EU institutions and the 27 Member States seek to 
manage the exit process in as orderly a manner as possible. The UK for 
its part sits on the other side of the table in that twilight zone between 
its status as a departing Member State and a third country. At time of 
writing, the UK has delivered its notification, the European Council has 
agreed on the guidelines and the Council has agreed for the Commission 
to initiate negotiating directives. The strategy of the EU27 is to be trans-
parent about all facets of the negotiations and all documents have been 
made public (EU 2017a). The first formal session of the exit negotiations 
was held on 19 June 2017 after the formation of the new UK Government.
 
Article 50 provides not just for the format of negotiations but also 
the sequencing of the substantive issues that must be addressed in the 
negotiations. Essentially the process must address three baskets of issues. 
The first basket is the disentanglement of the UK from the EU which is 
frequently referred to as the divorce settlement or withdrawal agreement. 
The second basket refers to the future relationship between the departing 
country and the EU27. The third basket addresses the transition from 
basket one to two, in other words the transition arrangements, if any, 
that will be agreed. Article 50 also makes provision for the automatic exit 
of the Member State in question two years after the notification unless 
there is unanimous agreement to extend the negotiating process. Hence, 
departure negotiations are time bound which imposes urgency on all 
those responsible for managing the process. As Armstrong pithily put it, 
‘The clock is ticking down. Time is short’ (Armstrong, 2017, 269). 
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Opening Positions 
The opening negotiating positions of the two parties were established in 
the key official documents that formally began the process. The Art 50 
notification letter represents formal UK Government policy which was 
submitted by the UK on 29 March, 2017 (UK Gov 2017a). The letter set 
out in broad terms how the UK approaches these negotiations. The letter 
is very clear about its core objective in the negotiations and that is to 
agree a ‘deep and special partnership’ between the UK and the EU, a for-
mula, which is used seven times in the short document. This is further 
elaborated as a ‘bold and ambitious Free Trade Agreement’ and an agree-
ment that includes both ‘trade and security cooperation’ (ibid). More-
over, the UK wants this agreement to be more substantial than anything 
the EU has ever offered a third country before. There is an ill-disguised 
attempt at issue linkage given the 11 references to security and 6 to trade. 
Clearly the UK thinks it has negotiating capital on security. Prior to noti-
fication, PM May had made a number of public statements that outlined 
her Government’s position such as the decision to withdraw from the 
single market and the removal of the UK from the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
The letter identifies UK objectives concerning the conduct of the 
negotiations expressed as a wish to negotiate the future partnership 
alongside the withdrawal agreement, in other words parallel negotiations 
to be completed within two years. In addition, there is a desire to move 
from overarching principles to technical discussions quickly and to dis-
aggregate the negotiations into policy areas. Finally the letter contains 
a veiled threat about the security consequences of any failure to reach 
agreement. The document could be summarised as high on ambition but 
sparse on identifying what the actual content of a ‘deep and special part-
nership’ might be. Crudely it could be translated into the aim of retaining 
as much access to the single market as possible and the highest level of 
cooperation within the constraints of UK redlines. 
The EU27 response was swift and emerged as a set of negotiating 
guidelines from the European Council and directives agreed by the Gen-
eral Affairs Council. The dominant and unexpected feature of the EU27 
approach has been the unity of the Member States, which is re-stated 
in the guidelines. The commitment to acting as one has created a pow-
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erful soft norm, which will be difficult to dislodge. The EU27 define their 
objective vis à vis the future relationship with the UK as a ‘close part-
nership’ which is not as ambitious as the ‘deep and special partnership’. 
There is however a commitment to working hard and striving towards 
agreement but within limits designed to protect the interests of the EU, 
the autonomy of its decision making systems and the role of its judicial 
processes. There can be no sector by sector approach to the future agree-
ment and any agreement must balance rights and obligations and rep-
resent a level playing field. The EU27 identify the three core issues that 
form part of the divorce negotiations: citizens, the financial settlement 
and Ireland. The Commission Task Force has produced substantial doc-
uments on all three facets of the withdrawal agreement and these nego-
tiating documents have been agreed by the remaining Member States. 
The focus on citizens relates to the uncertainty caused by the vote for the 
many millions of citizens who have exercised their treaty right to free 
movement. There is a desire on both sides to address this issue as the first 
issue to be dealt with in the negotiations. The financial settlement is likely 
to be strongly contested as it relates to the post-Brexit budgetary legacy of 
UK payments to the EU. There is no agreement on the modalities for cal-
culating this or the sums involved. The third issue, Ireland, has received 
considerable attention because Ireland which will remain a Member State 
will have the only land border with the UK. Any return to a hard border 
on the island of Ireland threatens the fragile peace. 
The EU27 and the UK differ fundamentally on the sequencing of the 
negotiations. Whereas the UK wanted parallel negotiations, the EU27 
was adamant that the negotiations would be phased and that there would 
be no discussions on the future relations before sufficient agreement has 
been reached on the withdrawal agreement. Thus, the Brexit negotiations 
began with a substantial gap between the opening positions of both sides. 
Successful negotiations require agreement on a shared course of action 
and this is certainly missing.
First Round of Negotiations 
Notwithstanding the fact that PM May did not achieve an overall majority, 
the opening meeting of the Brexit negotiations went ahead as planned 
on June 19, 2017. The meeting was largely procedural with the aim of 
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agreeing terms of reference for the conduct of the negotiations. Agree-
ment was reached on the structure of the negotiations, negotiating texts, 
the frequency of negotiating rounds and other modalities of the talks. 
Working groups have been set up to address citizens’ rights, the financial 
settlement and other separation issues. In addition a dialogue has been 
established concerning the Irish border. The distinction between working 
groups and a dialogue underline just how complex and difficult the ques-
tion of the Irish border is although both sides have pledged to achieve as 
frictionless a border as possible. The border question hinges on the cus-
toms union. If the UK exits the customs union, which remains its stated 
policy, then there will have to be EU border checks and controls. The UK 
will not be granted the benefits of customs union membership without 
the obligations. There may yet be differentiated treatment for Northern 
Ireland but this would require agreement on issues of rules of origin, 
co-operation between customs authorities on both sides of the border 
and risk management to ensure that the Irish border did not become a 
smugglers paradise. 
Both sides entered the negotiations divided on substance and pro-
cess. The likelihood of getting to ‘yes’ depends crucially on the first phase, 
on creating sufficient trust and momentum to propel these negotiations 
forward. Unfortunately for the UK, it will have to do significantly more 
than the EU27 to achieve this because it is the Member State that as opted 
for exit over voice. This will be difficult because of the highly politicised 
nature of the issue in the UK, a weakened prime minister and a deeply 
divided Conservative party cabinet and party. The Labour party also faces 
Brexit challenges as it does not hold a coherent and consistent policy. 
Moreover, the UK’s traditional approach to EU negotiations makes it dif-
ficult for it to make early concessions in order to generate momentum. 
The UK has tended in the past to push EU negotiations on every detail 
rather than establishing broad trade-offs. The UK pattern is to resort to 
voting against rather than getting concessions as part of the emerging 
majority and in extremis to look for opt-outs. The UK approach has 
tended to be ‘us’ and ‘them’ rather than viewing the EU as a collective 
endeavour. The rampant Europhobia of the British tabloid press serves to 
reinforce difference rather than commonality with the rest of Europe. The 
UK’s traditional strategy will not serve it well in these negotiations. The 
UK Government has to accept that these are asymmetric in which it is in 
the role of ‘demandeur’. It has limited negotiating capital, is under time 
pressure and must use its available capital carefully. 
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An early indicator of the imbalance of forces in these negotiations was 
the question of the phasing or sequencing of the negotiations. The Min-
ister for Brexit, David Davis, threatened to make this issue the ‘row of the 
summer’ but simply caved in at the June 19 meeting. The well-established 
and well-signalled EU27 position that negotiations must take place in 
phases won the day. This was always going to be the case as the European 
Council had not given the Commission a negotiating mandate to do any-
thing other than address the withdrawal agreement and only when suf-
ficient progress is made, to begin discussions of the future relationship. 
Agreement on the future relationship if as requested by the UK, is a Free 
Trade Agreement, cannot to be concluded within the time-frame allowed 
for by Article 50 (March 29, 2019). Moreover, the European Council not 
the UK will decide when sufficient progress has been made. This means 
that the UK has a major interest in getting the European Council to this 
position. Moreover, the UK as the country on the way out and the source 
of uncertainty and disruption for millions of people and businesses must 
create the incentives for the EU27 to invest in a long-term relationship 
with it. 
Citizens’ Move Centre Stage
Creating momentum will depend crucially on the negotiations con-
cerning EU citizens. Michel Barnier, the chief negotiator, signalled at the 
centrality of citizens’ rights in his State of the Union address in Florence 
in May 2017. His wide ranging address highlighted the complexities of 
this dossier and the EU27 commitment to protecting the rights of all 
those Europeans who live in the UK or UK citizens who live in the other 
EU States. This was followed by the publication of an EU document on 
Essential Principles on Citizens’ Rights on June 12, 2017. The EU set out 
exacting principles derived from existing EU law concerning the scope of 
its demands concerning citizens’ rights. The EU’s side opening demand is 
essentially that EU citizens should retain all acquired rights. 
The UK responded with its first publically available negotiating posi-
tion on citizens’ rights. The negotiations will focus on the differences 
between the two sides which remain significant. The most important 
divergence in preference is the role of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). The UK document clearly states that ‘The Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) will not have jurisdiction in the UK’ (UK, 2017, 
4). This causes a problem for the EU27 as its stated aim is that ’the Court 
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of Justice of the European Union should have full jurisdiction corre-
sponding to the duration of the protection of citizen’s rights in the With-
drawal Agreement’ (EU, 2017,4). The question of judicial enforcement 
is a major issue of principle and substance for both sides and unless a 
formula is arrived at to satisfy both parties, no agreement will be pos-
sible. The issue of the ECJ is also central to the post-membership agree-
ment and relationship. There are other issues concerning citizens such 
as the cut-off date for applying for residence and the status of those who 
arrive after the cut-off date. The UK has promised that it will simplify its 
bureaucratic procedures. EU citizens will only retain their status in the 
UK if they do not leave for a period of more than two years. There are 
also issues to do with family reunification. The reality of Brexit is that 
EU citizens in the UK will experience a loss of status. The outcome on 
citizens is not just of importance to those who are affected by it but will 
have a bearing on the remainder of the negotiations. 
Broad agreement on citizens would enable the negotiations to move 
to the more difficult issues of Ireland and the financial settlement. The 
financial settlement is the most fraught issue in the first phase given the 
high salience of UK budgetary contributions in the past. Again the UK 
will have to be flexible and engage actively in identifying what is to be 
included in the settlement. Without this there will be no move to the 
second phase and no trade agreement. If on the other hand, the European 
Council could agree by the October or December EC meeting that the 
second phase should begin, then the outline of a future deal and tran-
sitional arrangements might be possible within the time frame allotted 
in Article 50. However, here again, the UK has to be realistic; its future 
arrangements and benefits will be less than it has now across a wide range 
of sectors and forms of co-operation. 
Financial Services 
The impact of Brexit on financial services is entirely dependent on the 
future relationship that is negotiated between the EU27 and the UK. 
There is uncertainty about the timing and the outcome of these negoti-
ations and notwithstanding a myriad of Brexit related analyses, it would 
be foolhardy to predict what might happen by 2020. The issues sur-
rounding financial services relate to regulatory frameworks, equivalence 
and the ultimate judgements of individual financial institutions wishing 
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to access the European market. The certainty and clarity that produces 
a good investment climate has been disturbed by Brexit. It is clear that 
financial services are of core interest to the UK as the City of London is 
a global financial centre and is Europe’s financial hub. Moreover, the UK 
has become a service driven economy. The issues that are likely to dom-
inate the negotiations on financial services are (a) the question of pass-
porting rights for financial services, (b) Euro-clearing and (c) regulatory 
frameworks post Brexit. The objective of the UK will be to retain as much 
of the Europe related business it now has but in a new regulatory envi-
ronment as it does not want to come under the jurisdiction of the ECJ. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Mansion House speech (June 20, 
2017) acknowledged that ‘as Britain leaves the EU, there are genuine and 
reasonable concerns among our EU colleagues about oversight of finan-
cial markets that will then be outside the EU jurisdiction’ but he went on 
to say that ‘avoiding fragmentation of financial services is a huge prize 
for the economies of Europe’ (HM Treasury, 2017). The sub-text of his 
argument is, on the one hand, that there are significant regulatory chal-
lenges arising from Brexit, but that on the other hand, if the UK loses its 
current status this would also harm Europe. His offer is a ‘new process for 
establishing regulatory requirements for cross-border business between 
the UK and the EU. It must be evidence-based, symmetrical, and trans-
parent’ (ibid). Just how prepared the EU27 will be to offer the UK and 
the City of London a regulatory framework that allows it to retain all 
of the EU related business that it now has is impossible to predict given 
that there is as yet no negotiating document on this issue. It seems highly 
unlikely that the EU will agree to passporting, highly accommodating 
deals on equivalence, and the euro clearing market for a third country. 
The current conditions for UK financial services are unlikely to persist 
in the post-Brexit era. This does not mean that the City will cease to be a 
key player in financial services but it is unlikely to escape some costs and 
consequences of Brexit.
Conclusions 
At the time of writing the formal process of Brexit negotiations has com-
menced and given the legal rules, the UK will leave the EU on March 29th 
mid-night Brussels time. This exit date cannot be changed without the 
agreement of all 27 Member States. Given that the process has begun, it 
is likely although not certain that the UK will depart the European Union 
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in 2019. Political turbulence and fragility in London will hamper the UK 
Government’s ability to get the necessary legislation through Westmin-
ster and any future deal will go back to Parliament. The Parliament may 
return the issue to the people so that they have voice on the terms of 
exit. The relationship between London and the devolved administrations 
is also fraught and may spring some surprises. Nor should we take for 
granted that agreement will be reached between the EU27 and the UK. 
The negotiations could stall on any number of issues over the next two 
years and in any event two years is not enough to negotiate a signifi-
cant post Brexit relationship. The UK retains the right to leave without an 
agreement and to resort to WTO provisions, which do not in any case, 
cover the entire range of EU co-operation. Such a unilateral move would 
raise the costs and consequences of Brexit in unforeseeable ways and 
would represent an extraordinary fissure in UK relations with its near 
neighbourhood. Opting for national self-determination, the formula 
outlined in the withdrawal letter in a highly interdependent 21st century 
world, is an extraordinary gamble for a once great power. Paradoxically, 
PM Cameron’s desire to take the ‘European Question’ out of UK politics 
by holding a referendum has only served to heighten its salience and the 
divisions with the UK on the issue. It is reminiscent of the ‘Irish Ques-
tion’ which dogged UK politics through the 19th and 20th centuries and 
although both islands had achieved a modus vivendi by the end of the 
20th century, Brexit also re-opens the question of Ireland. 
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